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Recent research has demonstrated that retirement planning and well-being are closely tied 
to probabilistic forecasts about future events. Using longitudinal data from the Health and 
Retirement Study, I show that individuals’ subjective survival forecasts exhibit 
systematic biases relative to life table data. In particular, many respondents fail to 
account for increases in yearly mortality rates with age, both longitudinally and in cross-
section. Additionally, successive cohorts of the near elderly do not appear to revise 
survival forecasts to match increases in longevity. Forecasting bias may merely be due to 
the framing of questions designed to elicit expectations, but real biases may result in 
suboptimal savings rates and timing of retirement. Cross-sectional variation in subjective 
survival forecasts also appears to reflect differences in cognitive ability across 
respondents, suggesting that subjective information is more relevant for some individuals 
than others. Despite these shortcomings, subjective mortality probabilities predict actual 
mortality and portfolio choice, and they contain information not found in selfreported 
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The life-cycle model highlights the central role of expectations about future events in 
shaping the decisions of economic agents.  Individuals acquire human capital and make decisions 
about labor supply, consumption, and savings with the future in mind.  In particular, subjective 
expectations play a central role in retirement planning and well-being, and longevity risk 
highlights the importance of the availability of annuities such as Social Security benefits relative 
to relatively risky defined contribution or personal retirement accounts.  Expectations about 
future mortality also guide the decisions of firms and governments in the design of pensions and 
old-age assistance programs.  In spite of the widespread importance of expectations (particularly 
mortality forecasts) in decision-making, economists have not had access to reliable data on 
individual survival expectations until recently.  As an alternative, researchers have typically 
modeled economic behavior as a function of population-wide survival probabilities, as measured 
by published life tables.   
This study aims to investigate the validity and utility of relatively new sources of data on 
individual subjective expectations about mortality.  The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and 
the Asset and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD) include numerous questions about expectations, 
including the probability of working past ages 62 and 65, the probability of suffering a job loss in 
the next year, and the probability of surviving to a selection of target ages.  We analyze the 
subjective assessments of the likelihood of surviving to a range of target ages, with a focus on 
the evolution of these expectations over the life cycle in response to new information about one’s 
health and the health and mortality of relatives and peers.  The goal of this research is to shed 
new light on longstanding questions about the effects of information and financial planning 
education on the adequacy of retirement savings among the elderly.  In particular, do subjective 
expectations (and deviations of these expectations from population-wide life tables) influence 
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retirement, initial claiming of Social Security, and saving and asset allocation decisions among 
elderly individuals in the United States?  If so, researchers could incorporate errors in conditional 
survival forecasts into dynamic models of retirement and savings, highlighting the effects of 
mortality uncertainty on possible failures to smooth consumption at the end of the life cycle.   
Previous research on probabilistic expectations has attempted to assess the reliability of 
these measures in a number of ways.  Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Manski (2004) find 
substantial correlations between expectations and characteristics that actually affect mortality, 
such as tobacco use and regular physical activity.  Hurd et al (1998) and Hurd and McGarry 
(2002) find that survival self-assessments closely track future mortality in 6-year panels of the 
HRS.   Lillard and Willis (2001) and Kézdi and Willis (2003) take a novel approach, highlighting 
the role of the precision of individuals’ subjective assessments (rather than just the assessments 
themselves) on asset allocation and benefit claiming decisions.
1
 This project extends the previous 
research by focusing on conditional mortality expectations and by investigating the role of 
planning horizons and the framing of questions designed to elicit expectations as two possible 
sources of expectation errors.   
The following section describes the data used and provides an informal description of the 
usefulness of subjective survival assessments.  Section III focuses on conditional probabilities of 
survival, including a test of the notion that individuals cannot accurately forecast increases in 
yearly mortality rates with age.  Section IV explores strategies for identifying whether subjective 
assessments predict actual mortality and retirement.  Section V presents evidence on the role of 
new information and cognition in revisions of longevity expectations, with the results implying 
that changes (specifically, declines) in health are largely unexpected, since survival expectations 
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 Kézdi and Willis use a battery of the subjective questions administered in the HRS to construct an “index of 
precision”, inversely related to the fraction of focal probability answers (answers of exactly 0, 50, or 100 percent). 
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generally rise with age only when health does not change.  Section VI investigates the role of 
subjective beliefs on economic outcomes, particularly asset allocation decisions, and Section VII 
concludes. 
 
II. Data and Measures of Survival Forecasts 
The HRS is a national panel study that surveys four different cohorts.  The original HRS 
cohort, born between 1931 and 1941, was first interviewed in 1992 and subsequently every two 
years. The AHEAD cohort, consisting of individuals born before 1924, was initially a separate 
study from the HRS but has been part of the HRS since 1998. Third is the Children of 
Depression (CODA) cohort, born between 1924 and 1930 and first interviewed in 1998, and 
finally the War Baby (WB) cohort, born between 1942 and 1947 and also first interviewed in 
1998. In the original HRS cohort, a cross-section representative of the non-institutionalized 
population was selected for interview, as well as an oversample of African-Americans and 
Hispanics.  The HRS also interviewed spouses and domestic partners of target respondents, 
resulting in 12,652 individuals included in Wave 1.  
The first AHEAD interview, in 1993, represents the non-institutionalized population aged 
70 and older. Respondents were reinterviewed in 1995 and then at two-year intervals starting in 
1998.  Also in 1998, these cohorts were combined with the CODA cohort, meant to fill in the 9-
year age window not covered by the original HRS or the AHEAD, and the WB, intended to 
include those aged 51-56 in 1998.  From 1998 forward, the complete HRS sampling frame is 
meant to represent the population of Americans over age 50 who do not live in institutional 
settings (such as nursing homes).
2
  
                                                 
2
 This sampling design is intended to replicate the population represented by the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
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For this study, the primary measure of interest is derived from HRS respondents’ answers 
to three questions of the form: 
“On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is no chance and 100 is absolutely certain, what are 
the chances that you will live to age X or older?”  
All Wave 1 through 7 HRS/AHEAD respondents under age 65 were asked this question for X = 
75, and all respondents in Waves 1 through 4 under age 85 in the HRS were asked this question 
for X = 85.  Denote the answers to these questions as P75 and P85.  From Wave 5 onward and in 
all AHEAD waves, the latter question was replaced with one that asked about the likelihood of 
living roughly another 11 to 15 years. Specifically, those under age 70 were asked the likelihood 
of surviving to age 80; those between the ages of 70 and 74 were asked the likelihood of 
surviving to age 85; and so on      
Figure 1 plots age-specific average responses of P75, P85, and P(live to 85 | live to 75), 
which is calculated from the ratio of the likelihood of surviving to age 85 and the likelihood of 
survival to age 75: P85 / P75, divided by the corresponding life table probabilities.  The figure 
shows that pessimism in P75 gradually increases with the age of the respondents (a ratio of 1 
indicates an “accurate forecast” for a representative individual, relative to life tables).  This 
pattern is driven by the fact that, unlike life tables, average values of P75 do not increase with 
age.  Optimism in reports of both P85 and P85 / P75 appear roughly constant across age.  The 
pattern represented by Figure 1 does not vary with individual characteristics such as income, 
education, or race; perhaps surprisingly, these crude proxies of cognitive ability or financial 
planning literacy do little to explain the systematic positive bias in evaluations of subjective 
mortality.  On average, individuals at all ages slightly understate P75 and overstate P85 relative to 
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life table data, but both errors are subtle enough to lead previous researchers to assert that 
expectations are accurate overall. 
Figure 2 presents complementary evidence that a substantial number of individuals over-
predict the probability of surviving to age 85 conditional on reaching age 75.  The line in the 
figure plots the cumulative distribution function of P85 / P75 from subjective data minus P85 / P75 
from Vital Statistics life tables, revealing a large, systematic positive bias in self-reports.  In 
particular, the median over-prediction (corresponding to the point at which the CDF = 0.5) is 
roughly 0.17, a large bias relative to the actual conditional probability of survival of 0.38.  The 
25
th
 percentile of the difference is -0.10, while the 75
th
 percentile is roughly 0.42.  Only 34 
percent of HRS respondents report conditional survival probabilities less than or equal to the 
corresponding life table figures, which can be seen by noting the CDF evaluated at “zero error” 
in the figure.  As was the case for Figure 1, this apparent over-prediction holds across gender, 
racial, and educational categories, suggesting that regardless of socioeconomic status, changes in 
health near the end of the life cycle are difficult to assess in a probabilistic fashion.
3
   
The preceding findings do not suggest a cause for the differences in accuracy between P75 
and P85, but Figure 1 provides evidence that differences in forecasting horizons are not driving 
the results.  Those in their early fifties are pessimistic, on average, regarding the probability of 
surviving to age 75.  In contrast, individuals in their early sixties have sizeable optimistic biases 
about the probability of surviving to age 85.  The sharply increasing yearly death rates in the 65-
85 age range provide an alternative explanation for this phenomenon.
4
 We turn next to an 
                                                 
3
 Some care should be taken in interpreting these results.  Lillard and Willis (2001) find that individuals are more 
likely to provide focal responses to questions about expectations of events far in the future, suggesting that distant 
future events are sufficiently difficult to forecast (or that the wording of the questions is sufficiently difficult to 
understand) that subjective probability assessments may not provide reliable information. 
 
4
 For a representative man in 1992, the one-year mortality probability increases from less than two percent at age 65 
to over twelve percent by age 85. 
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analysis of whether HRS respondents may fail to understand the concept of increasing yearly 
mortality hazard rates.   
 
III. Increasing Hazards and the Usefulness of Subjective Responses 
The previous section presented preliminary evidence about one possible source of error in 
individual survival forecasts: individuals’ implied subjective distributions of age of death are 
substantially flatter than published life tables indicate.  Table 1 presents parallel evidence, 
reporting the average values of P75 and P85 in five age categories and separately by gender.  For 
all age and gender combinations, the average probability of surviving to age 75 is larger than that 
of living to age 85.  At a first glance, the subjective measures correlate well with the life table 
figures, but for all groups, assessments of survival to age 85 are substantially more optimistic 
than those based on age 75.  As previous studies (e.g., Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Hurd et al 
(1998)) have found, men are generally more optimistic than women, relative to life tables.  For 
instance, men and women aged 65 report nearly identical average rates of surviving to ages 75 
and 85, in spite of life table evidence that women are roughly nine percentage points more likely 
to live to 75 and sixteen percentage points more likely to live to age 85.  Men are slightly 
pessimistic about living to 75 and quite optimistic about living to 85, while women appear very 
pessimistic about survival to 75 and relatively accurate about survival to 85.  Similar to the 
findings of Hurd and McGarry (2002), the age gradient in subjective probabilities is flatter than 
the corresponding gradient for life-table probabilities, but this pattern appears to be driven 
entirely by the responses of women, who report only slight increases in survival probabilities 
with age.  
 9 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of subjective responses across gender and within age 
categories.  “Focal responses”, involving probabilities of 0, 0.5, or 1, represent roughly half of all 
responses to the age 75 question.  One interpretation of focal responses is that they do not 
represent accurate probabilities, but are based instead on rules of thumb regarding distant events 
that are difficult to forecast.  In light of this interpretation, it is surprising that focal responses are 
less prevalent in answers to questions about surviving to age 85 than age 75.  Moreover, the 
proportion of focal responses does not decline with age, which is contrary to the notion that long 
planning horizons are responsible for these responses.  We will return to the issue of whether 
focal responses represent accurate probabilities below. 
The overall picture of Tables 1 and 2 implies that subjective probability responses satisfy 
at least the most basic logical requirement of probabilities: they decrease with the planning 
horizon.  However, the implied flatness of subjective survival forecasts represents a systematic 
bias relative to life table data.  Hamermesh’s (1985) groundbreaking study of subjective survival 
forecasts suggests that this flatness may stem from individuals being able to extrapolate current 
life tables into the future, so that optimism about survival to age 85 may be rational.  If future 
increases in longevity affect mortality hazards for ages between 75 and 85 more than ages below 
75, then the lack of optimism for age 75 survival rates makes sense, but this conjecture cannot 
explain why individuals would be pessimistic about age 75 survival.  Additionally, changes in 
yearly life tables over the past decade suggest that decreases in death rates have occurred at 
relatively young ages as well as ages over 75.   
The notion that many individuals do not understand the concept of increasing yearly death 
rates provides an alternative hypothesis to explain the flat subjective longevity profile.  Consider a 
discrete-time model of conditional probabilities of survival, where at any age t, the probability of 
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dying before reaching age t+1 is given by λt .  It follows that the probability of surviving to age t2 























If per-year death rates are constant at the rate λ, then the probability of surviving to age t2 conditional 







So, for example, the probability of living to 75 for a 65 year old (i.e., conditional on reaching age 65) 
is  
Pr(live to age 75 | live to age 65) = (1 – λ)
10
 , 
and the probability of living to 85 for a 65 year old is 
Pr(live to age 85 | live to age 65)  = (1 – λ)
20
 , 
implying that P85 = (P75)
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As an informal test of this hypothesis, consider the two subjective probabilities among 
those aged exactly 65.  As noted above, if individuals (incorrectly) predict constant yearly death 
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rates, the probability of surviving 20 additional years will be the square of the probability of 
living 10 additional years, so that P85 = (P75)
 2
.  Figure 3 presents the distribution of P85 - (P75)
2
 
among 817 65 year-olds in the HRS who had valid responses to both subjective probability 
questions.  Nearly half of all respondents (46%) report P85  – (P75)
2
 ≥ 0, which would imply 
weakly decreasing yearly death rates, and the mean value of P85  – (P75)
2
 is -0.04.  Among this 
age group, the hypothesis of constant subjective hazards appears to be reasonably accurate.
5
 
Table 3 presents a more formal test of the constant hazard hypothesis based on linear 
OLS and 2SLS models of the relationship between log(P85) and log(P75) for all individuals aged 
50, 55, and 60 through 65 in the HRS.  Column (1) shows estimates of βt from OLS regressions 
with no additional covariates. A one-percent increase in P75 is associated with a 1.17 percent 
increase in P85 among 50-year-old respondents.  The associated standard error (in parentheses) is 
0.04. The corresponding value implied by the constant hazard rate hypothesis is 1.40, and the 
value from a similar regression that instead uses life table survival rates is 2.33.  Note that the 
value from the life table is substantially greater than that implied by the constant hazard 
hypothesis because yearly mortality hazards increase sharply with age.  In contrast, the fact that 
the estimate in column (1) is below that in column (5) suggests that individuals’ subjective 
forecasts imply decreasing yearly death rates with age.  Also note that, in contrast to the values 
in columns (4) and (5), the estimates in column (1) do not increase with age – the estimate for 65 
year olds is 1.12 (0.04), roughly the same as that for 50 year olds. 
The central obstacle in interpreting the estimates in column (1) of Table 3 is measurement 
error in the values of log(P75) and log(P85).  If measurement error in log(P75) is classical and 
orthogonal to measurement error in values of log(P75) elicited in other time periods, then 
                                                 
5
 The p-value for the hypothesis test is 0.18. The asymptotic distribution of the sample statistic is derived using 
standard first-order Taylor Series expansions, and bootstrapped standard errors yield qualitatively similar results. 
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instrumental variables estimates using other time period values as instruments can deliver 
consistent estimates of βt.  Any lags or leads of log(P75) are possible candidate instruments; 
column (2) of the table presents 2SLS estimates that instrument current log(P75) with the average 
of all other values of log(P75) that the individual reported.  All estimates from column (2) are 
greater than the corresponding ones in column (1), but are smaller than those implied by constant 
hazard rates for ages 60 and above.  As in column (1), there does not appear to be an age gradient 
in the estimated coefficients, which suggests that individuals do not update their subjective 
probabilities as they age.   
Column (3) of Table 3 presents 2SLS estimates using an additional identification 
strategy.  Previous authors such as Hamermesh (1985) and Hurd and McGarry (2002) have 
found that respondents’ subjective survival rates are correlated with measures of their parents’ 
(and spouse’s) mortality experiences, but that these parental mortality measures are only weakly 
correlated with self-reported health and more objective measures of health such as difficulties in 
activities of daily living (ADL’s).  These findings suggest another instrumental variables strategy 
for testing the constant hazard hypothesis.  Specifically, the excluded instruments are a set of 
indicator variables for whether each parent is still alive, 5-year ranges of current age if so, and 5-
year ranges of age at death if a parent is no longer living.  Column (3) of the table presents 
estimates based on this strategy.  The expected bias in these estimates is positive, because the 
index based on the full set of parental mortality measures is likely to be positively associated 
with unobservable determinants of log(P85) as well as log(P75).  As a result, the estimates 
constitute an upper bound on the actual parameter values.  Still, only half of the estimates (for 
ages 55, 60, 62, and 64) are larger than those implied by the constant hazard hypothesis.  Due to 
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the imprecision of the estimates, none of them are pointwise statistically indistinguishable from 
the constant hazard numbers.   
The overall pattern of Tables 1-3 implies that individuals nearing retirement age may 
discount the near future “too much” relative to the present and discount the distant future “too 
little” relative to the near future.  These errors will produce behavior similar to that induced by 
hyperbolic discounting, which leads to time-inconsistent consumption plans and suboptimal 
savings and retirement decisions.  These errors in the subjective data may result in planning 
“mistakes” such as suboptimal timing of OASDI benefit claiming or declines in consumption 
levels at retirement, and may be the driving force behind the puzzling finding that wealth 
increases throughout retirement for many individuals.
6
   
Even though the constant hazard hypothesis cannot be rejected using the methods 
described above, another source of data in the HRS indicates that individuals do learn that 
hazards are increasing over time.  Specifically, in Waves 4 through 7 of the HRS, WB, and 
CODA cohorts, and in all Waves of the AHEAD cohort, rather than being asked about the 
probability of survival to age 85, respondents report the likelihood of surviving another 11 to 15 
years.  Denote this probability as P10.  As noted above, respondents aged 65-69 are asked the 
probability of surviving to age 80, those aged 70-74 are asked the probability of surviving to 85, 
and so on (all respondents under the age of 65 are asked the probability of surviving to age 80).  
Figure 4 plots the average of these responses as a function of age at the survey date.  Two 
patterns are immediately apparent from the figure.  First, the probability of surviving for 11-15 
years declines as the five year age window increases, implying that across individuals, the 
subjective mortality hazards are increasing with age.  Second, these declines are not as large as 
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 Laitner and Silverman (2005) provide an alternative explanation of this “retirement-consumption puzzle” and a 




those associated with life table survival probabilities.  Again, individuals appear to overstate 
mortality rates at relatively young ages (up to age 80), and understate mortality rates from age 80 
onward.
7
   
Figure 4 suggests that individuals do account for increasing hazard rates with age, which 
apparently contradicts the inferences from Tables 1-3.  This apparent discrepancy may exist 
because one set of findings is generated from the probability beliefs of those under 65 years old, 
i.e., two probabilities from someone of a given age, while the other inference comes from a 
comparison of individuals at different ages.  These age-constant and age-varying estimates may 
differ because individuals’ expectations evolve throughout their lifetime, or because successive 
cohorts of individuals have different beliefs about their own mortality.  We will return to the 
second possibility below, but a first cut of the data implies that it does not hold - the average 
probability of surviving to a specific age is largely insensitive to cohort effects.  For example, 
those in their fifties in 1992 and those in their fifties in 2004 report roughly equal probabilities of 
survival to age 75.  This pattern suggests that the evolution of expectations throughout the life 
cycle may play a large role. 
The structure of the HRS subjective questions, and their evolution throughout time, 
allows for a comparison of individuals’ expectations as they age.  As noted above, the 
probability of surviving to age 85 conditional on surviving to 75 is indirectly elicited from those 
under age 65 in all years.  Unfortunately, respondents who are 75 years old never report the 
probability of living to age 85, which would provide another estimate of this conditional 
probability.  However, those aged 70 to 74 are asked this question six times between 1993 and 
2004.  Subjective probabilities of survival to age 85 for this group will likely slightly understate 
                                                 
7
 The overstatement at age 80 onward is much more pronounced for men, but women comprise a large proportion of 
the sample at these advanced ages. 
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the 10-year survival probability of 75 year olds, but the bias is likely to be small because the age 
gradient of the average age-85 survival probabilities is modest among the 70 to 74 year olds (the 
averages are largely insensitive to using responses of 74 year olds only).    Figure 5 presents 
histograms of the implied conditional values separately for the two groups, those under age 66 
and those aged 70 to 74.  As is apparent from the figure, the older group is more likely to report 
values below 0.5 (except for zero) and less likely to report large values.  Much of the difference 
appears to be driven by responses of exactly 1, since nearly 30 percent of respondents under 65 
reports the same value for P75 and P85. Still, the differences appear lower in the distribution as 






 percentiles being 0.3, 0.5, and 0.8 for the 70-74 group and 0.42, 
0.7, and 1 for the younger group, respectively.  This pattern suggests that individuals do revise 
their conditional survival forecasts downward as they age, implying that eventually survival 




IV. Subjective Responses as Predictors of Eventual Mortality 
 The most appropriate measure of the usefulness of subjective survival probabilities arguably 
involves whether they can predict in-sample mortality.  Hurd and McGarry (2002) analyzed this 
question using the first four waves of the HRS, finding that average values of P75 and P85 are higher 
among those who survive until 1998 than among those who do not.  The aging of the original HRS 
and AHEAD cohorts and the addition of the CODA and WB cohorts uncovers new information 
about the relationship between subjective survival probabilities and mortality, including the ability to 
precisely assess the accuracy of subjective survival forecasts. 
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 The HRS panel is now sufficiently long to allow for a within-individual comparison of these expectations across 
age, since the original cohort is 65 to 75 years old in 2006.  Analyzing changes across time for the same individuals, 




Figure 6 displays in-sample average mortality rates by the value sof P75 and P85 reported in 
the first wave an individual appeared in the survey.
9
  Both P75 and P85 appear to predict actual 
mortality outcomes well, particularly P75.  The in-sample probability of death is monotonically 
decreasing as a function of P75 until P75 equals 1.0.  Although several authors have suggested that 
“focal responses” of 0, 0.5, and 1.0 do not provide any real information to subjective questions, the 
implications of the table provide some confidence that they do.  Survival rates when P75 = 0 are 
lower than for any other value, and rates when P75 = 0.5 are lower than for any value of P75 greater 
than 0.5 and greater than for any response less than 0.5.  The glaring exception involves P75 values 
of 1.0, which are associated with higher mortality rates than any other response above 0.5.  A value 
of P75 of 1.0 is not pure noise, as the mortality rate for these individuals is lower than the mean death 
rate in the sample, but these responses should be viewed with skepticism.  Almost all sample 
members represented by the table have not yet reached 75, yet more than 10 percent of this group is 
deceased.  For brevity we do not report the distribution of P75 among survivors and non-survivors, 
but the former stochastically dominates the latter, with the density of P75 being lower among 
survivors for all values less than 0.5 and greater for all values greater than 0.5.   
The 2004 wave of the HRS presents a novel opportunity to study the predictive validity of 
subjective survival curves because the original 1993 AHEAD respondents have been in the sample 
for eleven years.  As such, if their assessments of P10 were accurate, in-sample mortality rates should 
be approaching the average assessment.  The top panel of Table 4 presents sample averages of P10, 
the corresponding life-table averages, and the actual survival rates among these respondents.  One 
would expect actual survival rates to be greater than both life table and subjective estimates for three 
reasons.  First, as Hurd et al (1998) notes, life tables may not represent the probability distributions 
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 These values of P75 and P85 are not adjusted for the age of the respondent.  The pattern of results is robust to such 
an adjustment, largely because the values do not vary substantially by age.   
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facing these respondents because the AHEAD did not sample institutionalized individuals, who 
presumably have relatively low survival rates.  Second, very few of these individuals have reached 
the age to which their assessments of P10 apply.  For example, a 70-year-old reports the subjective 
probability of surviving to age 85, but by 2004, a survivor has only reached age 81.  Third, and most 
significant, life tables at a point in time do not represent the actual mortality profile facing a 
particular cohort if age-specific mortality rates decline over time, as has happened since 1993 - life 
table survival rates are higher in 2003 (the last year published life tables were available, as of this 
writing) than in 1993.  This last limitation does not apply to subjective survival rates but may 
substantially affect the interpretation of life tables, especially among cohorts that experienced large 
gains in life expectancy.    
With these caveats in mind, the patterns shown in Panel A are still informative and largely 
mirror those noted above.  Specifically, optimism in subjective forecasts increases with age, relative 
to life table probabilities.  Actual survival rates are higher than either the subjective or the life table 
probabilities for ages below 80, but in the 80-84 age group actual survival rates dip below the 
subjective probabilities.  Among those aged 85-89 in 1995, actual 2004 survival rates are only 8.74 
percent, roughly one-fourth the mean value of P10.  The conjecture that subjective values of P10 are 
more useful than life table values due to sample composition and the ability of individuals to forecast 
changes life tables does not appear to be accurate, judging from the accordance with in-sample 
mortality.   
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents additional evidence about the usefulness of 
subjective survival probabilities among older populations.  Within each age range, the average 
value of P10 is higher among survivors than among those who died, but these differences are 
modest and declining with age.  Among those under 75 who died by 2004, the average 
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respondent reported a nearly 50 percent likelihood of surviving until at least 2004 (and as long as 
2008 for those aged 65 and 70).  This evidence is consistent with the notion that subjective 
survival forecasts are less accurate for those at the highest end of the age spectrum, possibly 
because individuals cannot accurately assess the likelihood of discrete changes in their health 
status.   
Table 5 presents additional information about the age profile of the association between 
subjective survival probabilities and actual in-sample survival rates in the HRS and AHEAD.  
The entries represent marginal effects of subjective and life table values of P10 in the wave an 
individual entered the sample from probit models of in-sample survival.  The first two columns 
of the table present estimates among those younger than 65.  The coefficient on the subjective 
probabilities in the first column is 0.013, with a standard error of 0.001, implying that a 10 point 
increase in subjective survival rates is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in actual 
survival (note that the coefficients have been scaled upward by a factor of 10 for readability).  
Similarly, a ten-percentage-point increase in the life table value is associated with a 2.4 
percentage point increase in survival.  Column (2) adds controls for marital status, race, 
ethnicity, living arrangements, assets, income, and body mass index.  The controls increase the 
explanatory power of the models, as the pseudo-R
2
 increases from 0.018 to 0.057, but do not 
substantially change the coefficient on P10.   
Columns (3) and (4) of the table repeat the estimates for those age 65 and over when first 
observed.  In these two specifications, life table values explain much more of the variation in 
survival rates than in the first two columns.  This pattern is primarily due to the fact that life table 
values vary much more in these age ranges because the target survival age varies across 
individuals (recall that the target is 11-15 years from one’s current age among those 65 and over, 
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but constant at 75 for those under age 65).  Most importantly, among those over age 65, life table 
information has a much stronger association with actual survival than does subjective 
information.  The (unreported) pseudo- R
2
 of a specification relating survival to subjective 
probabilities is only 0.02, compared to 0.11 in a model including only life table information.  For 
those over age 64, subjective probabilities apparently do contain information not contained in life 
tables, but only a modest amount; moreover, life tables in isolation appear to be stronger 
predictors of mortality than subjective values.  The addition of covariates does not substantially 
change any of the findings 
It is worth reemphasizing that life tables at a point in time do not capture the expected 
survival outcomes of a particular birth cohort if mortality rates are time varying.  Age-specific 
mortality rates in the U.S. declined steadily between 1993 and 2003, implying that 1993 life 
tables overstate the death rates of individuals between 1993 and 2003.  Likewise, 2003 life tables 
understate these death rates.  Figure 7 presents the 1993 values of subjective and life table 
probabilities for those in the original 1993 AHEAD sample (as in Figure 4), and adds 
information on actual survival rates and 2003 life table values.  Among those aged 69, 74, 79, 84, 
and 89, the target age in 1993 corresponds to a survivor’s actual age in 2004.  The survival 
percentages are monotonically decreasing in one’s original age in 1993, consistent with the 
increasing age gradient in yearly death rates.  More importantly, the actual survival rate of 
AHEAD respondents lies between the two life table values for four of the five relevant target 
ages; the survival rate among those 74 when originally surveyed is slightly higher than the 2003 
life table rate, although this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 
0.22).  This pattern is indicative that the AHEAD cohort is representative of the mortality 
experiences of the U.S. population in these ages.  As expected, the age profile of the subjective 
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averages is much flatter than either the life table or survival data.  The subjective probabilities 
under-predict survival by roughly 7 percentage points among 69 year olds in the 1993 AHEAD 
and over-predict survival substantially for those in the upper limits of the age range.  Again, 
these patterns imply that subjective mortality data exhibit systematic biases relative to life tables 
and actual survival rates.  This apparently discouraging result does not mean that subjective data 
are useless in explaining economic behavior, but it suggests that future efforts to understand the 
determinants of subjective responses, and the resulting biases, will be fruitful. 
 
V. Updating of Subjective Mortality Forecasts and the Relationship between Cognitive 
Ability and Subjective Responses 
 The biases uncovered above beg the question of how individuals form subjective 
probabilities, how they report these probabilities to survey enumerators, and how they update 
them in response to new information.  A number of previous authors have investigated the role 
of new information on individuals’ subjective responses.  Hurd and McGarry (2002) and Smith 
et al (2001) have noted that probabilities of survival to a given target age do not increase with 
age as much as life tables would imply, possibly because health changes are mostly unexpected.  
Similarly, Maestas (2006) finds that aggregate subjective measures do not evolve over time in 
response to aggregate information. 
 Table 6 presents evidence on the determinants of changes in subjective measures in the 
HRS.  In agreement with Maestas’s (2006) findings, the top panel of the table reports sample 
average value of P75 and P85 across HRS waves among those aged 55 to 65.  The findings are 
striking - although life tables evolved substantially during this twelve-year period, subjective 
responses remained largely constant.  Respondents in 1992 understated the probability of living 
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to age 75, and that bias has grown over time; in 2004, respondents’ average values of P75 were 
over 10 percentage points lower than the corresponding life table figures.  Panel B shows that 
although mortality rates have declined at older ages (80 and 85), subjective responses relevant to 
these ages have also stayed roughly constant.  These patterns represent a puzzle in the study of 
expectations since life tables are publicly available. 
The bottom panel of the table presents estimates of the determinants of the within-person 
evolution of survival probabilities as an individual ages, both subjective and objective.  The 
estimates reported are coefficients from regressions of survival probabilities on the respondent’s 
age, including individual fixed effects.  The first column essentially replicates the findings of 
Hurd and McGarry (2002), as it shows that subjective survival probabilities are insensitive to 
age.  The top point estimate of 0.01 implies that each year of age is associated with an increase in 
average values of P75 of only 0.01 of a percentage point; in contrast, the life table probability 
increases by 0.91 percentage points.  The findings for P85 are similar, in that that age does not 
significantly affect the subjective measures but dramatically affects life tables.  The second 
column adds indicators for objective measures of health, such as diagnoses of chronic diseases 
and difficulties with activities of daily living.  The estimates associated with life tables do not 
change, since life tables do not account for this information, but the estimates associated with P75 
and P85 increase.  Column (3) adds one additional control, an individual’s self-reported health 
status (on a scale of 1 to 5).  In this final specification, the subjective estimates increase 
dramatically relative to column (1), although in the case of P75 the estimate lies far below the life 
table estimate.  A comparison across columns confirms that the subjective measures do not 
embody the possibility of future health shocks, i.e., health declines among the near-elderly 
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appear to be largely unexpected.  Individuals do, however, revise their forecasts in the presence 
of these shocks, especially with longer planning horizons. 
The 2006 wave of the HRS provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the determinants of 
responses of subjective probabilities to new information.  The insensitivity of subjective 
measures to life tables implied by the top panels of Table 6 suggests that knowledge of life tables 
may not affect subjective survival probabilities, but a special module administered to 10% of 
2006 sample respondents elicited information intended to directly assess this relationship.  In 
particular, after individuals reported their subjective measures, they were asked a question 
designed to measure their knowledge of life tables: 
“Out of a group of 100 [men/women] your age, how many do you think will survive to 
the age of X?”  
As in the subjective probabilities themselves, the value of X depends on the current age of the 
respondent; it is equal to 75 for all those under age 65, 80 for those aged 65-69, 85 for those aged 
70-74, and so on.  After answering this question, the respondent is told the corresponding 2003 
life table value: 
“Now, suppose I told you that according to statistics, on average about [#] out of 100 
[men/women] your age should live to age X.” 
After being read the actual life table value, the respondent is then asked again for his or her 
subjective survival probability.  Ascertaining whether this updated value is related to the 
updating of life table information is of particular interest, so we construct two measures, the first 
being the difference between the two subjective probabilities, and the second being the 
difference between the subjective life table estimate and the actual life table value.   
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Before turning to the determinants of updating, it is informative to examine the responses 
themselves.  Figure 8 presents the average value of the subjective individual probabilities, the 
“subjective life tables”, and the actual life tables, by age.  The subjective probabilities are flatter 
than the life table rates, as noted above, and interestingly, so are the average subjective life table 
probabilities.  It appears that the subjective individual probabilities and subjective life tables 
track each other closely, with the individual probabilities being on average higher at every age 
(the exceptions are ages 56 and 58); the differences in the averages are statistically significant (p 
< 0.001).  The differences between actual and subjective life tables before age 65 imply that, on 
average, the near elderly are largely unaware of actual life table values. 
 Given that individuals appear to err systematically in assessing life table probabilities, 
particularly at younger ages, one might speculate that the presence of actual life table data would 
substantially change assessments of individual survival probabilities.  Table 7 presents evidence 
that this conjecture is incorrect.  The estimates in the table are linear OLS estimates of the effect 
of updates in life tables on updates in subjective individual survival rates.  Column (1) shows 
that a 1-point increase in life tables is associated with only a 0.034 point increase in subjective 
probabilities among those under age 65.  This is particularly surprising, given that this group’s 
average assessment of life table survival rates was roughly 10 points lower than actual life table 
averages.  Column (2) adds the value of the original subjective value as a regressor.  The 
estimates in this column imply that the subjective values are strongly mean reverting, since a 1-
point increase in the original response is associated with a 0.537-point decrease in the update.
10
  
The estimate associated with the life table update becomes negative; the reduction in the 
magnitude of this estimate is due to the negative association between the original subjective 
                                                 
10
 This mean reversion is not surprising, since the support of the survival probabilities is restricted to be within the 0-
1 interval.  Limiting the sample to those whose original response was between 30 and 70, for example, reduces the 
point estimate’s magnitude but does not eliminate it.  
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value and the life table update, resulting from the positive association between the original life 
table estimate and the original subjective estimate.   
The remaining columns in Table 7 present similar findings for those aged 65 and older, 
namely, that the updates in life tables and subjective probabilities are unrelated unconditionally 
and negatively related conditional on the value of the original subjective estimate.  Figure 9 
presents graphical evidence of the lack of correlation between the two updates.  Each circle 
corresponds to a value of the life table update, ranging from -69 to 81, and the size of the circle 
represents the number of individuals associated with that value.  The estimated simple linear 
regression line is overlaid on the figure.  Taken together, Table 7 and Figure 9 present 
compelling evidence that subjective beliefs about life tables and individual subjective 
probabilities are correlated because individuals use their beliefs about their own mortality 
experience to form beliefs about the population, not vice versa.  These findings imply that 
systematic biases in subjective probabilities may still exist even if all individuals had perfect 
knowledge of life tables. 
The Role of Cognition 
Previous studies have established a relationship between subjective beliefs and measures 
of cognition available in the HRS.  In particular, cognitive skills are positively associated with 
subjective survival probabilities.  The cause of this association is unclear because those with high 
cognitive functioning are presumably likely to live to older ages, but they also might be 
relatively more able to form accurate probability assessments.  Separating these two pathways is 
a difficult task, but the multiple questions in the HRS suggest a possible avenue.  In particular, if 
a better understanding of probability assessments is the driving force, one might suspect that the 
flatness in implied yearly hazards found above would be less pronounced among those with high 
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cognitive functioning.  Table 8 presents striking evidence that this is the case.  We have 
classified individuals into one of four categories based on their responses to questions in the 
“Cognition” section of the HRS.
11
   These measures are powerfully correlated with P75 but not 
P85.  The negative bias in subjective assessments of P75 appears to be much larger among those in 
the lowest cognitive quartile.  Alternatively, the negative bias may be constant across quartiles if 
actual survival rates are much higher among those in quartile four, but if that were the case, one 
would expect a positive association between cognition and P85.  Although these figures are only 
suggestive, they are consistent with the notion that those with higher cognition have greater 
survival rates and more accurate assessments of these rates.   
The cognitive measures in the HRS are limited in scope, and as argued above, the 
association between them and survival assessments are subject to problems of interpretation.  In 
order to further assess the role of cognition in forming beliefs about survival, we use information 
from another data set, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-1997 (NLSY97), which elicits 
5-year survival assessments from a sample of youths aged 13 to 16.  An advantage of the 
NLSY97 lies in the availability of a detailed set of measures of cognition, particularly scores on 
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).  Figure 10 shows the association between survival 
probabilities and standardized AFQT scores, with the size of a circle again indicating the number 
of respondents who reported a particular survival probability.  As in the HRS, cognition and 
survival beliefs are strongly positively correlated, with the value of 100 being an exception.  Life 
table survival rates for this group are roughly 99.8% and do not drop below 95% for any race or 
gender, so a response of under 80 percent is likely to reflect a mistake or a fundamental lack of 
knowledge about survival probabilities.  Put another way, the association between cognition and 
                                                 
11
 These assessments include measures of immediate and delayed word recall, questions such as “who is the 
president of the United States”, and questions designed to elicit arithmetic ability such as, “if 5 people all have the 
winning numbers in the lottery and the prize is two million dollars, how much will each of them get?” 
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survival probabilities in these data does not reflect a genuine association between actual survival 
rates and ability.  The findings in the NLSY and the HRS suggest that cognition and measures 
like P75 may be correlated for reasons distinct from actual mortality.  As a result, correlations 
between subjective probabilities and economic outcomes may operate solely through cognitive 
ability.  
 
VI. Subjective Mortality Forecasts and Portfolio Choice 
Economists are primarily interested in subjective beliefs about survival to the extent that 
they affect economic behavior such as savings and consumption, claiming of Social Security 
benefits, asset accumulation and portfolio choice, and bequests.  The preceding sections’ key 
lessons imply that uncovering these relationships is difficult in practice for many reasons, 
including systematic biases in survival beliefs, spurious correlations between beliefs and 
outcomes due to unmeasured cognitive ability, and measurement error in forecasts.  Indeed, 
many authors have failed to find a relationship between subjective forecasts and outcomes that 
should exist according to economic theory.  For example, Perry (2005) finds no evidence of an 
association between subjective mortality and asset decumulation after retirement, Bloom et al 
(2006) finds mixed evidence on the relationship between beliefs and retirement or asset levels, 
and Hurd et al (1998) find mixed evidence on the effect of beliefs on the timing of Social 
Security claiming. 
In this section, we will attempt to quantify the relationship between mortality forecasts 
and portfolio allocation decisions.  Portfolio theory posits that as an individual’s planning 
horizon lengthens, the individual should become more tolerant to volatility in year-to-year 
returns.  In the context of the HRS, this implies that those with higher subjective survival rates 
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should hold a riskier portfolio of assets, all else constant.  The empirical difficulty in holding “all 
else constant” lies in the likely correlation between determinants of responses to subjective 
probability questions and unobservable factors that affect portfolio choice.  Consider the top 
panel of Table 9.  Column (1) presents one measure of a portfolio’s volatility, the proportion of 
wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds, across 11 categories of the range of P75.  It is 
apparent that this proportion rises nearly monotonically with P75, with those giving a value of 
100 (or 1.0, if measured on a 0-1 scale) being the exception.  The discussion above implies that 
this pattern, particularly the dip at 100, may be entirely due to cognitive skills that are 
presumably correlated with asset allocation decisions - those with higher cognitive function may 
be more perceptive investors who have the skills and financial literacy needed to invest in the 
stock market. 
In order to attempt to untangle the various reasons underlying the correlation between the 
proportion of wealth invested in stocks and survival forecasts, we proceed in two steps.  In the 
first, we estimate nonparametric lowess-smoothed models of the relationship between the stock 
proportion and total asset holdings.  This procedure involves a locally weighted linear regression 
for each observation in the sample to generate smooth estimates of the proportion of wealth 
invested in stocks as a function of total wealth holdings.  If one is willing to maintain the 
assumption that total wealth is a sufficient statistic for the unobservable determinants of asset 
allocation decisions, the smoothed values of this relationship will encompass these 
unobservables.  These predicted values are shown in column (2) of the table, and they exhibit a 
positive correlation with P75, implying that those with more optimistic survival forecasts also 
have greater overall wealth holdings.  These smoothed values will be orthogonal to the 
component of survival probabilities that is unrelated to total wealth holdings; this orthogonal 
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component is shown in the third column, which is simply the difference between the first two 
columns.  This column shows that variation in subjective survival probabilities that is unrelated 
to total wealth holdings is still positively related to portfolio volatility, although less so than is 
the total variation in survival probabilities.  In particular, those with values of P75 between 90 and 
99 are estimated to have roughly 3.2 percent more of their assets invested in stocks and mutual 
funds than those with values of P75 between 50 and 59.  Again, the relationship appears nearly 
monotonic apart from those with P75 equal to 100. 
Panel B of Table 9 presents OLS estimates of the effect of subjective and life table values 
of P75 on the stock proportion.  The first two columns present naïve OLS estimates, with the key 
finding from these results being that the point estimates are quite sensitive to the inclusion of 
additional covariates such as education, race, and household composition; the estimate of interest 
declines from 0.111 to 0.049 once these controls are included.  Evidently, the subjective 
probabilities are correlated with observable factors related to stock ownership, which highlights 
the possibility that they are also correlated with the unobservable determinants.  Columns (3) and 
(4) present estimates with the residuals from the lowess models as dependent variables.  The 
estimates on the subjective P75 are much less sensitive to the inclusion of controls in this case, 
providing some reassurance that the procedure is robust to unobserved heterogeneity in the 
propensity to own stocks.  The preferred estimate, in column (4), implies that a 100 percent 
increase in P75 increases the proportion of one’s assets held in stocks and mutual funds by 2.1 
percentage points, a modest effect relative to the naïve OLS estimates.  Still, this value is 
statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels.  Although the magnitude of 
this estimate is of marginal economic significance, it does imply that survival probabilities 
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influence economic behavior - we tentatively conclude that subjective survival probabilities 
increase investor tolerance for risk. 
  
VII. Conclusions 
This paper has presented evidence on the nature of subjective survival probabilities in the 
Health and Retirement Study, with a focus on these measures’ usefulness as predictors of actual 
mortality and economic behavior.  We find that observed mortality forecasts exhibit systematic 
biases relative to life table data, and that these biases are not due to individuals correctly 
forecasting future changes in life tables.  Average subjective survival probabilities show signs of 
substantial pessimism relative to life tables about the likelihood of survival to relatively young 
ages, and equally sizeable optimism about the probability of survival to more advanced ages, 
particularly age 85 and beyond.  On average, HRS respondents aged 50 to 64 do not appear to 
account for the positive age gradient in yearly death rates.  In contrast, older individuals 
eventually revise their conditional survival forecasts downward as they age.  
Subjective survival probabilities predict in-sample mortality well at younger ages, but 
less so past age 65.  Among HRS respondents over age 75, initial survival forecasts among those 
who survive until 2004 are only modestly different from those of sample members who die by 
2004.  For all age groups, life table survival probabilities predict in-sample survival at least as 
well as subjective probabilities, with the relative predictive power of life tables being much 
greater among those over age 65.  Given this finding, it is puzzling that individuals do not 
modify their expectations in response to changes in life tables, even when life table data are 
directly given to them, as in the 2006 HRS module on health and mortality expectations.  
Cognitive ability appears to be a big part of the story, as those with greater measured 
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mathematical acuity report relatively more accurate subjective data that is more consistent with 
the age profile of mortality rates.  “Focal responses” of 0, 50, and 100 percent have received 
attention in the literature as a measure of forecasting accuracy, but only responses of 100 percent 
appear to be difficult to interpret.  Across a wide variety of survival and economic outcomes, 
those who report a 100 percent likelihood of survival appear fundamentally different from those 
who report probabilities in the 80s and 90s.   
Finally, we have documented the difficulties inherent in interpreting correlations between 
subjective survival probabilities and economic outcomes as causal effects.  Survival forecasts are 
likely to be correlated with unobservable determinants of outcomes such as the timing of OASDI 
benefit claiming, retirement, and the dynamics of asset holdings following retirement.  In spite of 
these difficulties, we tentatively conclude that optimism in longevity increases an individual’s 
tolerance for short-run volatility in investment returns, as measured by the proportion of wealth 
invested in stocks and mutual funds.  There is a large scope for future research relating 
subjective expectations to economic outcomes, and the principal goal in this area will involve 
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Table 1: Distribution of Subjective Probabilities of Living to Age 75 or 85 
         
 Panel A: Age 75 
 All  Male  Female 
Age range Subjective LT   Subjective LT   Subjective LT 
<50 64.46 71.41  56.05 60.65  66.12 73.61 
50-54 64.68 69.83  61.44 61.80  66.56 74.75 
55-60 64.72 71.13  63.01 64.26  65.97 76.53 
60-64 65.40 74.62  64.24 69.00  66.37 79.56 
65 66.88 77.97  66.61 73.63  67.16 82.57 
         
 Panel B: Age 85 
 All  Male  Female 
  Subjective LT   Subjective LT   Subjective LT 
<50 44.95 42.00  36.62 26.62  45.97 43.88 
50-54 43.34 38.11  39.16 27.25  45.82 44.55 
55-60 42.48 38.10  39.13 28.62  45.12 45.57 
60-64 42.91 39.26  40.36 30.66  45.25 47.18 




Table 2: Distribution of Subjective Probabilities of Living to Age 75 or 85 
       
 Panel A: Age 75 
Age range 0 0.01-0.49 0.5 0.51-0.99 1 N 
<50 6.28 11.57 22.63 40.79 18.72 3199 
50-54 5.88 11.75 23.64 39.77 18.96 14251 
55-60 5.94 11.51 24.15 38.25 20.14 21318 
60-64 5.26 10.98 24.97 38.05 20.74 19965 
65 3.89 10.39 26.6 36.85 22.28 2985 
       
       
 Panel B: Age 85 
Age range 0 0.01-0.49 0.5 0.51-0.99 1 N 
<50 15.75 31.4 18.23 26.52 8.1 2172 
50-54 16.49 32.71 18.78 23.09 8.92 9739 
55-60 17.23 33.21 18.9 21.7 8.97 14385 
60-64 16.77 33.16 19.14 21.31 9.63 10885 




Table 3: Tests of the Constant Hazard Hypothesis 






Implied by Constant 
hazard rate   
Life 
Table 
   OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS  
Age   N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
50  908 1.17 1.44 1.27 2.33 1.40 
   (0.04) (0.08) (0.26)   
        
55  2359 1.18 1.65 1.52 2.43 1.50 
   (0.03) (0.06) (0.18)   
        
60  2300 1.17 1.47 2.47 2.62 1.67 
   (0.03) (0.06) (0.64)   
        
61  2109 1.15 1.43 1.56 2.68 1.71 
   (0.03) (0.06) (0.21)   
        
62  1783 1.08 1.63 1.95 2.73 1.77 
   (0.03) (0.08) (0.33)   
        
63  1573 1.17 1.67 1.80 2.82 1.83 
   (0.03) (0.06) (0.26)   
        
64  1277 1.10 1.32 2.13 2.91 1.91 
   (0.03) (0.06) (0.48)   
        
65  728 1.12 1.57 1.95 3.03 2.00 
   (0.04) (0.09) (0.33)   
        
        
        
        
        
Note: The entries for each model are the coefficient, and standard error in parentheses, from 
linear mean regressions of log(P85) on log(P75).  Column 1 is estimated via OLS, column 2 uses 
other-period average values of P75 as instruments for P75, and column 3 uses saturated 
indicators of parental age and mortality as instruments.  Standard errors are adjusted for 





Table 4: Sample Mean Probabilities of Living 11 to 15 More Years and Survival Rates, by 
in-Sample Mortality Status - Men 
     
 Panel A: Means of P10 and 11-year survival rates 
 P10   
Age range Subjective Life Table Actual Survival Rate N 
65-69 53.57 51.31 71.12 606 
70-74 51.15 36.81 56.11 2274 
75-79 38.26 21.32 41.79 1610 
80-84 33.26 9.22 25.06 1080 
85-89 31.42 3.33 8.74 502 
     
     
 Panel B: P10 by 11-year Mortality Status 
     
 Survivors Non-Survivors 
Age range Subjective Life Table Subjective Life Table 
65-69 58.66 51.75 46.92 50.73 
70-74 52.65 36.70 49.23 36.95 
75-79 43.00 21.42 34.86 21.25 
80-84 35.50 8.96 32.51 9.30 




Table 5: The Association Between Subjective and Life Table Survival Probabilities 
and In-Sample Mortality, by Age 
      
  Under Age 65: Over Age 65: 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subjective  0.013 0.011 0.014 0.014 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Life Table  0.024 -0.005 0.081 0.071 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
      
Additional Controls? No Yes No Yes 
      
      
R
2
  0.018 0.057 0.122 0.137 
N  29,879 29,879 11,164 11,164 
      
      
      
Note: The entries in each column are marginal effects from probit models of actual 
within-sample survival in the HRS.  The coefficients and associated standard errors are 
multiplied by 10 for each of interpretation.  Columns (2) and (4) include additional 






Table 6: Sample Mean Probabilities of Living to 75 and 85 among those aged 55-
65, by HRS Wave 
     
  Panel A: Age 75 
Wave  Subjective Life Table N 
1992  64.21 70.20 6114 
1994  63.62 71.24 6390 
1996  64.90 72.44 7164 
1998  65.18 73.35 6637 
2000  66.55 74.60 6264 
2002  66.27 75.87 5794 
2004  65.40 76.23 5597 
     
  Panel B: Age 85 (80 after 1998) 
Wave  Subjective Life Table N 
1992  42.36 37.31 6103 
1994  41.10 37.92 6376 
1996  44.20 39.09 7205 
1998  43.21 40.04 6546 
2000  51.12 59.49 6190 
2002  51.40 60.92 5744 
2004  51.61 61.47 5552 
     
 
     
Panel C: Within-Respondent Estimates of the Effect of Age on Subjective and Life-
Table Survival Rates 
  
Control Set   
 N    
Outcome (Unique) (1) (2) (3) 
     
P75     
  Subjective 51730 0.01 0.10 0.18 
 (16811) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
  Life Table  0.91 0.91 0.91 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
P85     
  Subjective 29040 0.03 0.47 0.60 
 (13573) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
     
  Life Table  0.60 0.61 0.61 







Table 7: Determinants of Updating of Subjective Survival Probabilities 
      
  Under Age 65: Over Age 65: 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Life Table 
Update  0.034 -0.175 -0.013 -0.171 
  (0.044) (0.035) (0.060) (0.049) 
      
Original 
Subjective 
Value  … -0.537 … -0.515 
  … (0.026) … (0.033) 
      
      
R
2
  0.010 0.417 0.001 0.349 





Table 8: Average Subjective Survival Probabilities by Cognition, Education, 
and Race 
     
Cognition  P(Live to 75) P(Live to 85) N 
  Quartile 1  57.03 46.21 1007 
  Quartile 2  62.03 44.40 2046 
  Quartile 3  65.47 45.11 2281 
  Quartile 4  70.05 47.07 651 
     
Education     
  HS Dropout  50.92 39.08 672 
  GED  54.76 40.16 275 
  HS Graduate  62.08 43.74 1643 
  Some College  64.63 45.62 1677 
  College Graduate  70.86 49.79 1615 
     
Race     
  White  63.75 43.89 4957 
  Black   65.42 54.37 936 
  Other  54.06 41.49 433 
     








Table 9: Estimates of the Effect of Subjective Survival Probabilities on Portfolio Riskiness 
      
Panel A: Proportion of Wealth in Stocks by Value of Age-75 Survival Probabilities 
      
Range of P75   
Raw Proportion 
(1) Predicted (2) 
Difference (1-
2) N 
0-9  0.094 0.098 -0.003 2489 
10-19  0.112 0.113 -0.001 1118 
20-29  0.120 0.123 -0.003 1594 
30-39  0.141 0.127 0.015 979 
40-49  0.124 0.126 -0.002 1003 
50-59  0.138 0.138 0.000 11273 
60-69  0.167 0.150 0.017 1841 
70-79  0.177 0.155 0.022 5610 
80-89  0.182 0.157 0.025 6290 
90-99  0.191 0.159 0.032 3518 
100  0.146 0.135 0.011 8954 
      
Total  0.152 0.140 0.012 44,669 
      
      
Panel B: Estimates of Causal Effects 
      
  Naïve OLS Estimates: Adjusted for Wealth Holdings: 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subjective  0.111 0.049 0.028 0.021 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
      
Life Table  -0.092 0.024 0.091 -0.163 
  (0.023) (0.070) (0.094) (0.063) 
      
Additional Controls? No Yes No Yes 
      
      
R
2
  0.008 0.137 0.003 0.008 
N  44,669 44,669 44,669 44,669 
      
      
      
      
      
      
Note: The entries in each column in Panel B are coefficients from OLS models of the proportion 
of assets invested in stocks in the HRS.  The coefficients and associated standard errors are 
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.  Columns (2) and (4) include additional controls as 
described in the text.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.  In 
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the residual from a smoothed lowess estimate of 
the proportion of wealth invested in stocks as a function of wealth levels. 
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